At least it didn't take eight months and "advanced data analytics, sophisticated metrics, and cutting-edge hiring methods" to figure it out this time.
Like it did after the 2022 World Cup, the U.S. Soccer Federation decided to bring back the coach who guided the team to an uncompetitive round of 16 exit against a Benelux nation. And despite a dalliance with AC Milan earlier this summer and a stated desire to return to the Premier League eventually, Mauricio Pochettino decided he wanted to come back, too. Earlier this week, U.S. Soccer announced a new contract that will keep Pochettino on as USMNT head coach through the 2030 World Cup.
And so, a new World Cup cycle begins for the USMNT with a full-time manager in place for the first time in 12 years. It went poorly back then -- Jurgen Klinsmann was fired during the next World Cup qualification campaign, and Bruce Arena wasn't able to dig the team out of the hole.
And it didn't go well when they brought back Gregg Berhalter for a second cycle, either. He lasted for seven total competitive matches and lost his job when the Americans were eliminated from the group stage at the Copa America in 2024.
Pochettino has a much longer and much more impressive managerial résumé than either of those two. Plus, he took over less than two years before the 2026 World Cup, in a cycle without any qualifying matches or a full-strength Gold Cup squad. For those reasons, there's less of a risk of what we've seen before with the USMNT and so many other nations: They might be clinging to a coach whose methods have already reached their expiration date.
If we only account for the games that truly matter -- the ones with competitive stakes, where a coach has access to all of the uninjured players in the pool -- then Pochettino has only managed nine games with the USMNT. In the Premier League, for example, past performance doesn't even really become predictive of future performance until around the 10-game mark.
But amidst all of those vagaries, the challenge for Pochettino over the next cycle is pretty clear. He needs to figure out a way to do what he was hired to do and what he still hasn't done yet: to actually make the team better.
Why the USMNT looked better -- but didn't get better -- under Pochettino
The easiest, somewhat advanced method we have for comparing team performance across eras is the Elo ratings. Every match you play, you are awarded or subtracted points based on the following: the quality of your opponent, the scoreline, the location of the game, the importance of the match. Based on total points, every team is ranked.
The current top four in Elo, in order: Spain, Argentina, England and France. The results don't always -- and shouldn't -- match up like this, but these were the clear four best teams in the world at this summer's World Cup.
As for the USMNT, they currently sit at 31st -- one spot below Algeria, one above Scotland. During the World Cup, they peaked at 23rd -- after the win against Australia.
Here, though, is how the USMNT has progressed under every manager who has coached at least 10 games since the 1994 World Cup:
Since Pochettino took over in September 2024, the team has improved by six ranking places and 21 rating points. For context, 20 points is usually worth somewhere between three and six spots.
Interestingly, the entirety of the rating jump, all 21 points, came at the World Cup this past summer -- and that's including a 3-2 loss to Turkey that docked the Americans 39 points for dropping a game with a nearly entirely rotated starting 11. So, if you only look at the World Cup, you have a pretty decent argument that USMNT has improved under Pochettino.
As I wrote throughout the tournament, players on teams don't play like the USMNT did on their own. The positional rotations in the midfield and with the wingbacks, the high pressing -- none of that shows up, let alone works, without a clear managerial vision and ability to implement the strategy across his players.
The U.S. scored 11 goals this past summer -- their previous World Cup record was seven. They won three matches -- the same amount they won at the 2022, 2018, 2014, 2010 and 2006 World Cups ... combined. Although the endpoint was the same disappointing exit to a more talented team, the performance before that point was inarguably way, way better than it had been in the past. That is a version of progress.
The picture, though, starts to get more muddled once you look beyond the opening kickoff against Paraguay in Los Angeles. If we fold in the other four competitive games where Pochettino had full-strength rosters, the USMNT lost 21 Elo points in the Nations League.
If we fold in the B-minus team's performance in the 2025 Gold Cup, that's seven more lost points -- thanks to a shootout win (counts as a draw) against a weak Costa Rica side and the 2-1 loss in the final to Mexico. And if we fold in the Gennaro-Gattuso-like run of friendlies -- wins against Senegal, Uruguay and Japan, losses to anyone they played from Europe -- then we're right back where we started.
When Berhalter was fired after the Copa America loss to Uruguay, the USMNT stood at 31st in the Elo ratings. Or, exactly where they are right now.
So, how can the USMNT actually improve under Pochettino?
There are two broad answers to the question.
The first: Play more competitive games. This shouldn't be a problem.
In addition to likely playing in the 2028 Copa America, the USMNT will need to qualify for the 2030 World Cup. Concacaf qualification doesn't figure to be especially challenging given the quality of teams in the confederation and now that the World Cup has expanded to as many as 64 teams. But playing more games that matter, regardless of the opposition, is always going to be a good thing.
As much as I tend to bristle against this kind of impossible-to-prove-or-disprove analysis, the loss to Belgium in the World Cup round of 16 really did seem like the result of a bunch of players wilting against the pressure of the moment. While an away game against, say, Honduras provides a totally different kind of challenge to beating Portugal or the Netherlands, it still stresses the lineup and the ideas in a valuable way.
There's also the question of how competitive you want to view the friendlies. After Pochettino changed lineups and formations seemingly every match for the year-plus leading up to the World Cup, the first four games of the World Cup seemed to show that there was a plan all along, that the frustrating losses with strange setups were actually worth it. There was a coherent system and set of relationships that only happens with a lot of training groundwork.
Of course, then it all exploded against Belgium and suddenly the opposite seemed true: Maybe if they'd settled on a starting 11 and style earlier, they wouldn't have fallen apart against the first more talented opponents they faced.
The truth is somewhere in the middle: Friendlies are a rare chance to experiment in a sport where you don't play 162 or 82 regular-season games before the playoffs even begin. At the same time, any game is so rare in international soccer that a decision to experiment means you're losing vital time for your best players to play together in their best positions, often against superior talent.
Managing that balance isn't a calculus Pochettino has ever had to make as a club coach, and it's not something you ever really get taught, either.
This then ties in with the second answer to the question: Be better against better teams.
Across Pochettino's tenure, the USMNT has played 13 games against teams ranked inside FIFA's top 25 and 18 outside of it. Their records:
Within the top 25: 3 wins, 1 draw, 9 losses, 17 goals for, 29 goals against
Outside the top 25: 14 wins, 1 draw, 3 losses, 40 goals, 16 goals against
Unsurprisingly, the USMNT is better against worse teams, but should the gap really be that big?
This is the main tactical challenge that every USMNT manager faces: When you're the most talented team in your confederation, how do you prepare to play against teams that are more talented?
The high-pressing, midfield-runner approach is the exact way you want to play when you're the better team. It's not that it can't work against better teams, but it definitely opens you up to what happened against Belgium or what happened in any of the friendlies the USMNT has played against other European nations.
Granted, Pochettino has done exactly this in the past, instituting a physical high press that allowed first Southampton and then Tottenham to outperform their talent levels. But that was in an era when most teams still weren't used to facing a high press. Now everyone who plays on a more talented team than the USMNT is going to know how to counteract that.
The USMNT are obviously a way better team than Paraguay -- scoreboard -- but the latter beat Germany in penalties and nearly brought France to overtime by playing uber-conservatively, while the Americans got smoked by a Belgium team that's less talented than either of those two sides. There's clearly a higher ceiling to the aggressive approach the Americans took, but there's also a much lower floor.
Develop the USMNT to play how Paraguay did, and the Belgium game is likely closer, but then they're also probably not winning the group and likely landing a much tougher knockout draw. Plus, then they're likely not captivating the country's attention in the same way if they're just sitting back and countering.
I genuinely do think this is a tricky problem to solve, but a bunch of hedge fund guys are paying a large part of his salary because Pochettino is supposed to be able to solve it.
What would help the most, I think, is somebody who can pass the ball -- over and over again. The only player on the roster this summer who was able to control the tempo of games with his passing was Tim Ream: He's 38, fell apart against Belgium and shouldn't be in the picture for the 2030 cycle.
The rest of the roster has players who add value with their passing, but only in certain situations: around the penalty area, or out on the wing. A player who can complete 90 passes in a game, push the ball forward when it needs to go forward, slow the game when it gets too wild. That's the kind of player who makes it easier to play across the various styles that the USMNT might need in order to get over the hump over the next four years.
Pochettino will need to turn over the players' pool. The team's average age, weighted by minutes played, this summer was 26.7. They were one of the younger teams at the tournament, but if it's the same side in 2030, they will be older than all but two teams from this summer. Swap out Ream, and they would still be one of the older teams -- if not quite as aged.
Perhaps Augsburg's Noahkai Banks decides to play for the USMNT instead of Germany, turns into a star and not only easily replaces but also upgrades on Ream. Maybe Adri Mehmeti, currently starting in midfield for the New York Red Bulls at 17, gets fast-tracked and fulfills some of his massive potential early. Maybe one of the other young starters in MLS does the same.
It's also possible that one of the fringe midfielders -- Middlesbrough's Aidan Morris, Lyon's Tanner Tessmann, Atletico Madrid's Johnny Cardoso or even Milan's Yunus Musah -- turns into the kind of controlling passer the team needs. Although the combined probabilities get you closer to it happening with someone, none of those individual examples seem particularly likely on their own.
The 2026 World Cup was the World Cup where it was all supposed to happen: The golden generation of Christian Pulisic and Weston McKennie were in their primes, and they were playing at home. It was the best the Americans have ever looked at a World Cup, but the end result was the same.
Now, ahead of 2030, all Pochettino has to do is cycle out a bunch of the most talented American soccer players we've ever seen, figure out how to beat better teams while barely playing any competitive games against better teams and make sure that the team improves while Pulisic and his peers age out of their primes. Good luck!