In 1998, Barry Bonds hadn't yet morphed into Super Barry, the guy who put up slow-pitch softball numbers against major-league pitchers. But he was still as feared as any hitter in the game. He hit .303 with 37 home runs that year while leading the National League in intentional walks for the seventh straight season.

The craziest of those intentional walks came on May 28, when Bonds came up in the bottom of the ninth inning with two outs and the bases loaded, the Arizona Diamondbacks leading the San Francisco Giants 8-6. Bonds didn't start that game, having entered in the eighth as a pinch-hitter and drawing a walk against Diamondbacks closer Gregg Olson.

In the ninth, David Dellucci had homered to give Arizona and 8-5 lead. Olson was wild, however, and two walks, a double and an RBI groundout had made the score 8-6. J.T. Snow, batting ahead of Bonds, walked with first base open to load the bases, Olson's fifth walk of the game, including two in the eighth. Bonds was now up again, with catcher Brent Mayne on deck. Olson threw right-handed; Mayne, like Bonds, hit from the left side.

Then, the unthinkable: Arizona manager Buck Showalter ordered the intentional walk to Bonds with the bases loaded, making the score 8-7. The strategy was obviously nearly unprecedented, last seen in 1944 when Giants manager Mel Ott walked the Cubs' Bill Nicholson in the eighth inning of the second game of a doubleheader. Nicholson had swatted four home runs in the doubleheader; the strategy backfired as the Cubs tied the game that inning, although the Giants scored twice in the bottom of the eighth to win 12-10.

With Bonds up, a base hit would have only likely tied the game. With Mayne up and the score now 8-7, a base hit likely wins it. Of course, Bonds was much more likely to hit a home run than Mayne, but a base hit from either batter was still a more likely outcome than a home run.

Was it the right strategy?

Last year, Showalter told the Washington Post, "Check out Barry Bonds' numbers off Gregg Olson in a misty rainstorm with the mound slipping around and no curveball. Nothing good was going to happen. And if you told him to pitch around him, he couldn't command the ball well enough slipping and sliding." Of course, Olson's issues of slipping and sliding would also exist against Mayne, increasing the probability that he'd walk him and tie up the game.

Here's the video of Bonds' plate appearance. I can't quite tell if there's really a misty rainstorm going on or not, although you can see some diamond dry on the pitching mound. I love the look of amazement on Bonds' face and then an air of disgust as he flicks the bat as he walks to first base and kind of gives Olson a nasty little glare. I miss Barry Bonds.

Leaving aside walks and the issues of the weather, Showalter was essentially weighing the odds of Bonds getting an extra-base hit that would win the game versus the odds of Mayne getting any kind of hit that would win the game. Bonds had an extra-base hit in 15.9 percent of his at-bats in 1998; Mayne would hit .273 in 1998 after hitting .289 in 1997, so you can estimate he had a 28 percent chance of getting a hit. That would seem to suggest Showalter made the wrong decision. But Bonds also hit a single in 14.3 percent of his at-bats. So Bonds was more likely to at least tie the game but pitching to Mayne with the winning run on second increased the Giants' chances of winning.

In the end, Showalter didn't really have time to analyze the situation beyond "Barry Bonds scares the crap out of me and Brent Mayne doesn't." He went with his gut, not the odds, and it worked -- barely -- as Mayne worked the count full, fouled off a pitch, and then in the eighth pitch of the at-bat, lined out to right field. Olson had finished off the improbable 53-pitch, six-walk save.

Bonds the next day: "I've had a whole night to think about it and I still don't know what to say. I don't know how to put it into words. Buck made history. Let him discuss it."

That night, Showalter had said, "I wish I had a picture of Kelly Stinnett looking at me. He said, 'I thought I missed something.' He was looking for the open base. 'There are only three or four players in this game you'd do it with, and Bonds is one of them."

In that Washington Post story 16 years later, Showalter admitted, "We were lucky."

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Two final quick notes.

Sam Miller of Baseball Prospectus wrote a piece last year on Bonds' intentional walks. This one actually graded as only the second-worst in terms of Win Probability Added. On Aug. 6, 1996, the Reds led the Giants by a run with Bonds leading off the bottom of the ninth. Reds manager Ray Knight had Jeff Brantley walk Bonds. The moved worked that time as well, as Bonds was left stranded at second base.

Since Bonds, there has been one more intentional walk with the bases loaded, when Joe Maddon walked Josh Hamilton in the bottom of the ninth in a 2008 game. The Rays led the Rangers 7-3 with two outs so Maddon was simply avoiding a potential game-tying grand slam. He had Grant Balfour walk Hamilton and then brought in Dan Wheeler to face Marlon Byrd, who struck out to end the game.

Of course, the intentional walks to Bonds started coming even more often after 1998. In 2002, he was intentionally walked 68 times, then 61 the following season. In 2004, when he hit .362 and slugged .812, he drew 120 intentional walks on his way to 232 walks on the season. Absolutely incredible.

Buck Showalter, my friends, wasn't the only manager afraid to pitch to Bonds.